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Abstract: Taking the move from our recent research on GNSS Avionics Based Integrity Augmentation (ABIA), 
this article investigates the synergies of ABIA with a novel Detect-and-Avoid (DAA) architecture for Remotely 
Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS).  Based on simulation and experimental data collected on a variety of manned and 
unmanned aircraft, it was observed that the integration of ABIA with DAA has the potential to provide an 
integrity-augmented DAA for both cooperative and non-cooperative applications. The candidate DAA system uses 
various Forward-Looking Sensors (FLS) for the non-cooperative case and Automatic Dependent Surveillance-
Broadcast (ADS-B) in addition to TCAS/ASAS for the cooperative case. Both in the cooperative and non-
cooperative cases, the risk of collision is evaluated by setting a threshold on the Probability Density Function 
(PDF) of a Near Mid-Air Collision (NMAC) event over the separation area. So, if the specified threshold is 
exceeded, an avoidance manoeuvre is performed based on a heading-based Differential Geometry (DG) algorithm 
and optimized utilizing a cost function with minimum time constraints and fuel penalty criteria weighted as a 
function of separation distance. Additionally, the optimised avoidance trajectory considers the constraints imposed 
by the ABIA in terms of RPAS platform dynamics and GNSS constellation satellite elevation angles, preventing 
degradation or losses of navigation data during the whole DAA loop. This integration scheme allows real-time 
trajectory corrections to re-establish the Required Navigation Performance (RNP) when actual GNSS accuracy 
degradations and/or data losses take place (e.g., due to aircraft-satellite relative geometry, GNSS receiver tracking, 
interference, jamming or other external factors).  Cooperative and non-cooperative simulation case studies were 
accomplished to evaluate the performance of this Integrity-Augmented DAA (IAS) architecture.  The selected host 
platform was the AEROSONDE RPAS and the simulation cases were performed in a representative cross-section 
of the RPAS operational flight envelope. The simulation results show that the proposed IAS architecture is capable 
of performing high-integrity conflict detection and resolution when GNSS is the primary source of navigation data. 
 
 
Introduction 
In addition to Space Based Augmentation Systems 
(SBAS) and Ground Based Augmentation Systems 
(GBAS), Global Navigation Satellite System 
(GNSS) augmentation can also take the form of 
additional information being provided by other 
avionic systems. In most cases, the additional avionic 
systems operate via separate principles than the 
GNSS and, therefore, are not subject to the same 
sources of error or interference. A system such as 
this is referred to as an Avionics-Based or Aircraft-
Based Augmentation System (ABAS). While GBAS 
and SBAS address all four cornerstones of GNSS 
performance augmentation (i.e., accuracy, integrity, 
availability and continuity), the ABAS approach is 
particularly well suited to increase the levels of 
integrity and accuracy of GNSS in a variety of 
mission- and safety-critical aviation applications. In 
RPAS applications, airworthiness drivers for both 
cooperative and non-cooperative Detect-and-Avoid 
(DAA) impose stringent GNSS data integrity 
requirements.  Therefore, a properly designed and 
certifiable Avionics Based Integrity Augmentation 
(ABIA) capability would allow an extended 
spectrum of autonomous and safety-critical 
operations by continuously monitoring GNSS 
integrity levels and providing suitable caution and 
warning signals to the remote pilot or to the avionics 
flight control systems in order to accomplish GNSS-
based mission and safety-critical tasks.  This 
increased level of integrity could provide a pathway 
to support the challenging task of RPAS certification 
for unrestricted access to commercial airspace.  
Although current and likely future SBAS/GBAS 
augmentation systems can provide significant 
improvement of GNSS navigation performance, a 
properly designed and flight certified ABAS/ABIA 
system could play a key role in GNSS integrity 
augmentation for aviation safety-critical applications, 
including RPAS DAA.  Furthermore, using suitable 
data link and data processing technologies on the 
ground, a certified ABAS/ABIA capability could be 
one of the core elements of a future GNSS Space-
Ground-Avionics Augmentation Network (SGAAN). 
 
ABIA Research  
Previous research on ABIA systems demonstrated 
the potential of this technology to enhance GNSS 
integrity performance in a variety of mission- and 
safety-critical applications including experimental 
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flight test/flight inspection, precision approach and 
automatic landing [1-5]. Therefore, an advanced 
ABIA system was developed for RPAS applications 
(Figure 1).  In this system, the on-board sensors 
provide information on the aircraft relevant flight 
parameters (navigation data, engine settings, etc.) to 
an Integrity Flag Generator (IFG), which is also 
connected to the GNSS system.  Using the available 
data on GNSS and the relevant aircraft flight 
parameters, integrity signals are generated which can 
be sent to the RPAS Ground Station (RGS) or used 
by a Flight Path Optimisation Module (FPOM). This 
system addresses both the predictive and reactive 
nature of GNSS integrity augmentation by producing 
suitable integrity flags (cautions and warnings) in 
case of predicted/ascertained GNSS data losses or 
unacceptable signal degradations exceeding the 
Required Navigation Performance (RNP) specified 
for each phase of flight, and providing guidance 
information to the remote pilot/autopilot to avoid 
further data losses/degradations.    
 
 
Figure 1 ABIA system architecture for RPAS 
applications 
 
To achieve this, an Integrity Flag Generator (IFG) 
module produces the following integrity flags [1-3]: 
 Caution Integrity Flag (CIF): a predictive 
annunciation that the GNSS data delivered to the 
avionics system is going to exceed the RNP 
thresholds specified for the current and planned 
flight operational tasks (GNSS alert status).  
 
 Warning Integrity Flag (WIF): a reactive 
annunciation that the GNSS data delivered to the 
avionics system has exceeded the RNP thresholds 
specified for the current flight operational task 
(GNSS fault status).  
The following definitions of Time-to-Alert (TTA) 
are applicable to the ABIA system [1]: 
 ABIA Time-to-Caution (TTC): the minimum 
time allowed for the caution flag to be provided 
to the user before the onset of a GNSS fault 
resulting in an unsafe condition.  
 ABIA Time-to-Warning (TTW): the maximum 
time allowed from the moment a GNSS fault 
resulting in an unsafe condition is detected to the 
moment that the ABIA system provides a 
warning flag to the user. 
 
ABIA Integrity Flag Generator (IFG) 
The main causes of GNSS data degradation or signal 
losses in aviation applications were deeply analysed 
in [1] and are listed below:  
 Antenna obscuration (i.e., obstructions from the 
wings, fuselage and empennage during 
maneuvers); 
 Adverse satellite geometry, resulting in high 
Position Dilution of Precision (PDOP); 
 Fading, resulting in reduced carrier-to-noise 
ratios (C/N0); 
 Doppler shift, impacting signal tracking and 
acquisition/reacquisition time; 
 Multipath effects,  leading to a reduced C/N0 and 
to  range/phase errors; 
 Interference and jamming. 
Understanding the physics of these phenomena and 
developing reliable mathematical models was 
essential in order to properly design the ABIA IFG 
module [1, 2]. Figure 2 shows the architecture of the 
IFG module and its interfaces.   
 
Figure 2 ABIA IFG module architecture 
The ABIA IFG module is designed to provide CIF 
and WIF alerts in real-time (i.e., in accordance with 
the specified TTC and TTW requirements in all 
relevant flight phases).  IFG module inputs are from 
the GNSS receiver and other aircraft sensors. The 
GNSS and Sensors Layer (GSL) passes the aircraft 
Position, Velocity, Time (PVT) and attitude (Euler 
angles) data (from the on board Inertial Navigation 
Systems, Air Data Computer, etc.), GNSS data (raw 
measurements and PVT) and the Flight Control 
System (FCS) actuators data to the Data Extraction 
Layer (DEL). At this stage, the required Navigation 
and Flight Dynamics (NFD) and GNSS Constellation 
Data (GCD) are extracted, together with the relevant 
information from an aircraft Three-Dimensional 
Model (3DM) and from a Terrain and Objects 
Database (TOD). The 3DM database is a detailed 
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geometric model of the aircraft built in a Computer 
Aided Three-dimensional Interactive Application 
(CATIA). The TOD uses a Digital Terrain Elevation 
Database (DTED) and additional man-made objects 
data to obtain a detailed map of the surfaces 
neighbouring the aircraft.  In the Integrity Processing 
Layer (IPL), the Doppler Analysis Module (DAM) 
calculates the Doppler shift by processing the NFD 
and GCD inputs. The Multipath Analysis Module 
(MAM) processes the 3DM, TOD, GNSS 
Constellation Module (GCM) and A/C 
Navigation/Dynamics Module (ADM) inputs to 
determine multipath contributions from the aircraft 
(wings/fuselage) and from the terrain/objects close to 
the aircraft. The Obscuration Analysis Module 
(OAM) receives inputs from the 3DM, GCS and 
ADS, and computes the GNSS antenna obscuration 
matrixes corresponding to the various aircraft 
manoeuvres. The Signal Analysis Module (SAM) 
calculates the C/N0 of the direct GNSS signals 
received by the aircraft in the presence of 
atmospheric propagation disturbances, as well as the 
applicable radio frequency interference and 
Jamming-to-Signal ratio (J/S) levels. The Integrity 
Flags Layer (IFL) uses a set of predefined CIF/WIF 
threshold parameters to trigger the generation of both 
caution and warning flags associated with antenna 
obscuration, Doppler shift, multipath, carrier, 
interference and satellite geometry degradations. The 
approach adopted to set-up thresholds for the ABIA 
CIF and WIF integrity flags is depicted in Figure 3.  
The masking integrity flag criteria are the following: 
  When the current aircraft manoeuvre will lead 
to less than 4 satellite in view, the CIF shall be 
generated. 
  When less than 4 satellites are in view, the WIF 
shall be generated. 
Additionally, when only four satellites are in view: 
 When one (or more) satellite(s) elevation angle 
(antenna frame) is less than 10 degrees, CIF 
shall be generated. 
 When one (or more) satellite(s) elevation angle 
is less than 5 degrees, WIF shall be generated. 
From the definition of Dilution of Precision (DOP) 
factors, GNSS accuracy can be expressed by [6]: 
                                       (1) 
where   is the standard deviation of the positioning 
accuracy and      is the standard deviation of the 
satellite pseudorange measurement error. Therefore, 
the 1-sigma Estimated Position, Horizontal and 
Vertical Errors of a GNSS receiver can be calculated 
using the PDOP (EPE in 3D), the HDOP (EHE in 
2D) or the VDOP (EVE).  In order to generate CIFs 
and WIFs that are consistent with current GNSS 
RNP, we need to introduce the Horizontal and 
Vertical Accuracy (HA/VA) requirements in the 
various flight phases.  The Horizontal Alert Limit 
(HAL) is the radius of a circle in the horizontal 
plane, with its centre being at the true position, 
which describes the region which is required to 
contain the indicated horizontal position with the 
required probability for a particular navigation mode.  
Similarly, the Vertical Alert Limit (VAL) is half the 
length of a segment on the vertical axis, with its 
centre being at the true position, which describes the 
region which is required to contain the indicated 
vertical position with the required probability for a 
particular navigation mode.  As a result of our 
discussion, the DOP integrity flags criteria are the 
following: 
  When the EHE exceeds the HA 95% or the VA 
95% alert requirements, the CIF shall be 
generated. 
 When the EHE exceeds the HAL or the EVE 
exceeds the VAL, the WIF shall be generated. 
 
Figure 3 Integrity flag thresholds 
 
During the landing phase, a GNSS Landing System 
(GLS) has to be augmented by GBAS in order to 
achieve the RNP, as well as Lateral and Vertical 
Protection Levels (LPL and VPL).  LPL/VPL is 
defined as the statistical error value that bounds the 
Lateral/Vertical Navigation System Error (NSE) with 
a specified level of confidence.  In particular, for the 
case of Local Area Augmentation System (LAAS), 
which allows for multiple Differential Global 
Positioning System (DGPS) reference receivers (up 
to four) to be implemented, two different hypotheses 
are made regarding the presence of errors in the 
measurements.  These hypotheses are: 
H0 Hypothesis – No faults are present in the range 
measurements (includes both the signal and the 
receiver measurements) used in the ground station to 
compute the differential corrections; 
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H1 Hypothesis – A fault is present in one or more 
range measurements and is caused by one of the 
reference receivers used in the ground station.  
Consequently, LPL and VPL are computed as 
follows: 
                                      (2) 
                                     (3) 
VPL and LPL for the H0 and H1 hypotheses are 
calculated as described in [16].  The lateral and 
vertical accuracy (NSE 95%) and alert limits 
required by a GLS in the presence of LAAS, 
considering the continuously varying position of the 
aircraft with respect to the Landing Threshold Point 
(LTP) are given in [7].  Additionally, [7] provides 
the so-called Continuity of Protection Levels in 
terms of Predicted Lateral and Vertical Protection 
Levels (PLPL and PVPL).  Although the definition 
in [7] is quite comprehensive, a generic statement is 
made that the PVPL and PLPL computations shall be 
based on the ranging sources expected to be 
available for the duration of the approach.  In other 
terms, it is implied that the airborne subsystem shall 
determine which ranging sources are expected to be 
available, including the ground subsystem’s 
declaration of satellite differential correction 
availability (satellite setting information). 
Unfortunately, this generic definition does not 
address the various conditions for satellite signal 
losses associated to specific aircraft manoeuvres 
(including curved GLS precision approaches).  
Therefore, it is suggested that an extended definition 
of PLPL and PVPL is developed taking into account 
the continuously varying aircraft-satellite relative 
geometry (masking envelope).  In particular, when 
the current aircraft manoeuvre will lead to less than 4 
satellites in view or unacceptable accuracy 
degradations, the CIF shall be generated. Following 
our discussion, the additional integrity flags criteria 
adopted for GLS in the presence of LAAS are the 
following: 
 When the PLPL exceeds LAL or PVPL exceeds 
the VAL, the CIF shall be generated. 
 When the LPL exceeds the LAL or the VPL 
exceeds the VAL, the WIF shall be generated. 
Multipath integrity flags were defined using the 
Early-Late Phase (ELP) observable and the range 
error [8].  As described in [2], the multipath integrity 
flags criteria are the following: 
  When the ELP exceeds 0.1 radians, the caution 
integrity flag shall be generated. 
 When the multipath range error exceeds 1 
meter, the warning integrity flag shall be 
generated. 
In order to define the integrity thresholds associated 
with Doppler and fading effects, a dedicated analysis 
of the GNSS receiver tracking performance was 
required.  When the GNSS measurement errors 
exceed certain thresholds, the receiver loses lock to 
the satellites. Since both the code and carrier tracking 
loops are nonlinear, especially near the threshold 
regions, only Monte Carlo simulations of the GNSS 
receiver in different dynamics and SNR conditions 
can determine the receiver tracking performance [6, 
9, 10].  Nevertheless, some conservative rule of 
thumbs that approximate the measurement errors of 
the GNSS tracking loops can be used.  Numerous 
sources of measurement errors affect the Phase Lock 
Loop (PLL) and the Frequency Lock Loop (FLL).  
However, for our purposes, it is sufficient to analyze 
the dominant error sources in each type of tracking 
loop.   Considering a typical GNSS receivers 
employing a two-quadrant arctangent discriminator, 
the PLL threshold is given by [6]: 
               
                  (4) 
where: 
   = 1-sigma phase jitter from all sources except 
dynamic stress error; 
   = dynamic stress error in the PLL tracking loop. 
 
Frequency jitter due to thermal noise and dynamic 
stress error are the main errors in a GNSS receiver 
FLL.  The receiver tracking threshold is such that the 
3-sigma jitter must not exceed one-fourth of the 
frequency pull-in range of the FLL discriminator. 
Therefore, the FLL tracking threshold is [6]: 
                                   (5) 
where: 
3     = 3-sigma thermal noise frequency jitter; 
     = dynamic stress error in the FLL tracking loop. 
 
Regarding the code tracking loop, a conservative 
rule-of-thumb for the Delay Lock Loop (DLL) 
tracking threshold is that the 3-sigma value of the 
jitter due to all sources of loop stress must not 
exceed the correlator spacing (d), expressed in chips.  
Therefore [6]: 
                                    (6) 
where: 
      = 1-sigma thermal noise code tracking jitter; 
Re = dynamic stress error in the DLL. 
 
The Phase Lock Loop (PLL), FLL and DLL error 
models described in [2] allow determining the      
corresponding to the receiver tracking thresholds.  
The Scalar Tracking Loops (STL) typically employ 
Delay Lock Loops (DLL) to track the code phase and 
Phase Lock Loops (PLL) or Frequency Lock Loops 
(FLL) to track the carrier phase. State-of-the-art STL 
also employ combined PLL and FLL for carrier 
tracking to obtain better results in navigation position 
accuracy and enhanced tracking. Recently, Vector 
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Tracking Loops (VTL) have been employed, which 
are based on an advanced receiver architecture 
capable of tracking signals in a combined manner. 
VTL has the advantage of operating at a lower total 
carrier power to noise ratio (C/No) and in higher 
manoeuvrability when compared to STL logics. The 
general      integrity flag criterion applicable to the 
ABIA system is:    
 
 
  
 
         
    
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
   
 
 
 
  
 
   
  
 
  
 
   
 
  
 
  
 
       
  
 
  
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
  (7)                      
where           is the minimum      for PLL 
tracking,          is the minimum      for FLL 
tracking,          is the minimum      for DLL 
tracking,              is the minimum      for 
combined PLL and FLL tracking and          is 
the minimum      for VTL based tracking. 
Numerical solutions of Eqs. (4), (5) and (6) show 
that the weak link in unaided avionics GNSS 
receivers is the carrier tracking loop threshold 
(greater sensitivity to dynamics stress).  Therefore, 
the           threshold can be adopted in these 
cases. In general, when the PLL loop order is made 
higher, there is an improvement in dynamic stress 
performance.  Therefore, third order PLL are widely 
adopted in avionics GNSS receivers.  Assuming 15 
to 18 Hz noise bandwidth and 5 to 20 msec 
predetection integration time (typical values for 
avionics receivers), the rule-of-thumb tracking 
threshold for the PLL gives 25 to 28 dB-Hz.  
Additionally, in aided avionics receiver applications, 
the PLL tracking threshold can be significantly 
reduced by using external velocity aiding in the 
carrier tracking loop.  With this provision, a tracking 
threshold of approximately 15 to 18 dB-Hz can be 
achieved.  Using these theoretical and experimental 
threshold values, we can also calculate the receiver 
Jamming-to-Signal (J/S) performance for the various 
cases of practical interest, as described in [1]. When 
available, flight test data collected in representative 
portions of the aircraft operational flight envelope (or 
the results of Monte Carlo simulation) shall be used.  
Taking an additional 5% margin on the 3-sigma 
tracking thresholds for the CIF, the following 
additional criteria are introduced for the ABIA 
integrity thresholds: 
 
 When either                
   
                                 
       , the CIF shall be generated. 
 When either         
 or            or 
        the WIF shall be generated. 
In avionics receivers, lock detectors are used to 
assess if the satellite signals are being tracked or not 
tracked.  Code lock detection is very similar to 
estimating the received      , inferring that the 
receiver is operating on or near the correlation peak.  
Knowledge of code lock is obviously parallel to the 
knowledge of received signal power. The receiver’s 
code-correlation process has to raise the signal out of 
the noise.  The spread spectrum processing gain (  ) 
is defined as the ratio of the spread bandwidth to the 
unspread (baseband) bandwidth and is expressed in 
dB.  The post-correlation signal-to-noise ratio can be 
calculated by [11]: 
                                        (8) 
When the receiver code is aligned with the 
transmitted code, the signal power at the band pass 
output is crushed into approximately 100 Hz of 
bandwidth.  The processing gain can be calculated 
from: 
              
   
  
                          (9) 
where CR is the chipping rate and TD is the data 
period.  For the C/A-code this works out to be about 
43 dB.  Typical avionics receivers have a cut off 
value at 10 dB, which means that if the value is less 
than this the satellite signal level is too low to be 
used in the positioning computations [12].  Therefore, 
an additional threshold to be accounted for is: 
                                               (10) 
During experimental flight test activities performed 
with unaided L1 C/A code avionics receivers, it was 
also found that, in a variety of dynamics conditions, 
a      of 25 dB-Hz was sufficient to keep tracking 
of the satellites [11].  Consequently, taking a 2 dB 
margin for the CIF, the following criteria are adopted 
for the S/N integrity flags: 
 When the      is less than 27dB-Hz or the 
difference between the S/N and the processing 
gain is less than 12 dB, the CIF shall be 
generated.  
 When the      is less than 25dB-Hz or the 
difference between the S/N and the processing 
gain is less than 10 dB, the WIF shall be 
generated.  
Additionally, with reference to the individual 
satellites being tracked, the following additional 
criteria are defined: 
 The CIF is triggered if there are less than 5 
satellites in view (without any individual satellite 
CIF)  
 The WIF is triggered if less than 5 satellites are 
remaining with one or more individual satellite 
CIF.  
 
The ABIA system monitors the GNSS performances 
and gathers appropriate data to detect a departure 
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from the nominal service state. The system also 
reports aberrant behaviour to the pilot/autopilot who 
in turn is responsible for acting to either modify the 
aircraft trajectory (or terminate the service). The 
functions are performed in a sequential manner and 
each function is modelled as a time-to-complete 
process. The cumulative sum of all four function 
completion times defines the time required for their 
associated integrity assurance process to respond to a 
navigation service failure. The response model 
provides the overall time-to-complete by considering 
the times required for monitoring, detecting, 
reporting and reacting (computing and commanding 
an optimised trajectory free from GNSS data 
degradations) and is given by [1, 14]: 
 
                              +                 
                                       (13) 
 
ABIA Flight Path Optimisation Module  
The ABIA FPOM performs the fundamental task 
optimising the RPAS trajectory in line with the 
ABIA IFG constraints (CIF/TTC and WIF/TTW).  
This problem can be solved like other optimal 
control problems by using a variety of direct or 
indirect methods. In the initial implementation, a 
standard Gauss pseudospectral transcription method 
was adopted.  However, other techniques can be 
adopted for the FPOM module based on numerical 
performance requirements (rate of convergence, 
stability, etc.) for the specific flight task at hand. In 
particular, simpler/faster geometric optimisation 
algorithms can be adopted to ensure the real-time 
performance of the trajectory optimisation task in 
safety-critical DAA applications (e.g., close mid-air 
encounters). The ABIA FPOM architecture is 
depicted in Figure 4.   
 
 
Figure 4 ABIA FPOM architecture 
 
The RPAS flight dynamics and the IFG driven path 
constraints provide the full set of dynamic 
constraints to generate flyable trajectories. The 
boundary conditions include minimum, maximum, 
initial and final values for the state and command 
variables. These are provided by the aircraft sensors 
(i.e., current flight parameters), and by the FMS (i.e., 
flight plan data). The cost functions represent the 
performance criteria that must be minimized. As all 
necessary IFG constraints are already included in the 
path constraints, the cost functions are based on a 
number of key parameters, including minimum time 
and minimum fuel (fuel penalty) criteria. 
 
RPAS Dynamics Model 
The aircraft dynamics model is a 3-Degree of 
Freedom (3-DoF) point mass and unsteady flight 
model with variable mass (due to fuel consumption). 
The full set of 3-DOF scalar equations is: 
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                                      (20) 
where   is the aircraft mass,   is the aerodynamic 
speed,   is the thrust magnitude,   is the angle of 
attack,   is the altitude,   is the lift,   is the drag,   is 
the nominal acceleration of gravity,   is the flight 
path angle (FPA),   is the bank or roll angle,   is the 
heading angle,      is the specific fuel consumption, 
  is the geodetic latitude,   is the geodetic longitude, 
   is the meridional radius of curvature and    is the 
transverse radius of curvature. Additionally, 
aerodynamic and propulsion parameters are 
calculated separately.  
 
Detect-and-Avoid system 
Both cooperative and non-cooperative DAA systems 
are being developed to address RPAS safe 
integration into the non-segregated airspace [15]. 
The DAA capability can be defined as the automatic 
detection of possible conflicts (i.e., collision threats) 
by the RPAS platform and the implementation of 
avoidance manoeuvres to prevent the identified 
collision threats. As part of our research, the possible 
synergies attainable with the adoption of different 
detection, tracking and trajectory generation 
algorithms were studied. The combined DAA 
architecture is depicted in Figure 5 with an 
identification of primary (solid line) and auxiliary 
sensors (dashed line) for cooperative and non-
cooperative DAA tasks. An analysis of the available 
DAA candidate technologies and the associated 
sensors was presented in [16-20]. An approach to the 
definition of encounter models and their applications 
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on the DAA strategies is presented in [21] 
considering both cooperative and non-cooperative 
scenarios. The error propagation from different 
sources and the impacts of host and intruders 
dynamics on the ultimate DAA solution were 
investigated [18]. The requirements for developing 
an effective DAA system can be derived from the 
current regulations applicable for the human pilot 
see-and-avoid capability. Criticality analysis is 
carried out to prioritize (i.e. to determine if a 
collision risk threshold is exceeded for all the tracked 
intruders) and to determine the action commands. If 
an avoidance action is required, the DAA system 
generates and optimises an avoidance trajectory 
according to a cost function defined by {minimum 
distance, fuel, time and closure rate} with the aid of 
differential geometry algorithms to generate a 
smooth trajectory. 
 
 
Figure 5 DAA system architecture 
 
In the non-cooperative scenario, the system employs 
navigation-based image stabilization with image 
morphology operations and a multi-branch Viterbi 
filter for obstacle detection, which allows heading 
estimation. The system utilizes a Track-to-Track (T
3
) 
algorithm for data fusion that allows combining data 
from different tracks obtained with FLS and/or ADS-
B depending on the scenario. Successively, it utilizes 
an Interacting Multiple Model (IMM) algorithm to 
estimate the state vector allowing a prediction of the 
intruder trajectory over a specified time horizon. 
Both in the cooperative and non-cooperative cases, 
the risk of collision is evaluated by setting a 
threshold on the Probability Density Function (PDF) 
of a Near Mid-Air Collision (NMAC) event over the 
separation area. So, if the specified threshold is 
exceeded, an avoidance manoeuvre is performed 
based on a heading-based Differential Geometry 
(DG) algorithm and optimized utilizing a cost 
function with minimum time constraints and fuel 
penalty criteria weighted as a function of separation 
distance. A dedicated analysis is performed to 
determine the overall uncertainty volume in the 
airspace surrounding the intruder track. This is 
accomplished by considering both the navigation and 
tracking errors affecting the measurements and 
translating them to unified range and bearing 
uncertainty descriptors. In order to quantify the 
errors, let    ,     and     represent the standard 
deviations of the navigation error  (   ,        ) and 
tracking error (   ,        ) in the  ,   and   cardinal 
directions respectively. The range and bearing errors 
associated with the intruder tracking process are 
transformed into a local Cartesian coordinate frame 
(either host or intruder body frame). The overall 
uncertainty volume is obtained by combining these 
two error ellipsoids using spherical harmonics 
decomposition [17].  
 
ABIA/DAA systems integration  
The ABIA/DAA integrated architecture is illustrated 
in Figure 6. The Position, Velocity and Attitude 
(PVA) measurements are obtained from an Extended 
Kalman Filter (EKF) that fuses data from GNSS and 
other navigation sensors [22-27].  
 
Figure 6 ABIA/DAA integrated architecture 
Based on availability, either C-DAA or N-DAA 
sensors are used for granting safe separation. In 
parallel, the ABIA flight path optimization process 
starts when the CIF is generated. Pseudospectral 
Optimisation (PSO) or Differential Geometry 
Optimization (DGO) techniques are used to generate 
a set of optimal trajectory solutions free of near mid-
air conflicts and integrity degradations. The selection 
of PSO or DGO is based on the available time 
horizons for the ABIA and DAA processes. The 
Frenet-Serret equations are used to describe host 
RPAS/intruder relative motion [16] and a minimum 
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separation distance is defined taking into account the 
combined navigation/tracking uncertainty volume. If 
the distance between the RPAS and the moving 
intruder is or will be less than the separation distance 
at a specific time interval, then a conflict condition is 
established. Time and fuel are used as criteria in the 
cost functional (applying different weightings to 
obtain a set of feasible solutions), the dynamic model 
is used as the dynamic constraint, and satellite 
elevation criteria are used as path constraints. 
Boundary conditions are set from the values of flight 
parameters when the CIF is generated. The selection 
of the optimal trajectory from the generated set of 
safe trajectories is performed is based on 
minimisation of the following cost function [19, 20]: 
                            
                                 (21) 
where: 
      is the estimated distance of the generated 
avoidance trajectory points from the avoidance 
volume associated with the obstacle. 
                is the estimated minimum 
distance of the avoidance trajectory from the 
avoidance volume. 
               is the time at which the safe 
avoidance condition is successfully attained. 
      
  
 
    is the specific fuel consumption. 
      is the thrust profile. 
               are the weightings attributed to 
time, fuel, distance and integral distance 
respectively. 
In time-critical avoidance applications (i.e., closing-
up obstacles with high relative velocities) 
appropriate higher weightings are used for the time 
and distance cost elements. 
Simulation case studies 
A number of simulation case studies were performed 
to evaluate the performance of the ABIA and 
integrated ABIA/DAA systems.   A GNSS 
constellation simulator (GCS) was developed to 
calculate GNSS satellite position and velocity in the 
Earth-Centred Earth-Fixed (ECEF) reference frame 
and to obtain satellite visibility data from any point 
along the aircraft flight trajectory.  The GCS was 
implemented in MATLAB
®
 to simulate both GPS 
and GALILEO constellations. The satellite position 
and velocity were calculated from the Kepler's laws 
of orbital motion using either the YUMA or SEM 
almanac data [28, 29] for GPS and a standard Walker 
constellation (27/3/1), which means 27 satellites in 
three Medium Earth Orbit (MEO) planes with 1 
active spare satellite per orbital plane.  The selected 
ABIA/DAA host platform was the AEROSONDE 
RPAS and various geometric parameters were 
extracted from the literature to draw a detailed 3-D 
model of this aircraft [30].  
 
ABIA IFG Simulation 
In order to validate the design of the ABIA IFG 
module, a MATLAB
®
 simulation activity was 
performed employing the algorithms developed 
during this research. The simulated AEROSONDE 
RPAS trajectory included the following flight phases: 
 Climb phase (0-300s); 
 Turning climb phase (300-600s); 
 Straight and level (cruise) phase (600-900s); 
 Level turn phase (900-1200s)  
 Turn and descend phase (1200-1500s); 
 Approach (straight) phase (1500-1800s); 
The combined GPS/GALILEO constellation was 
simulated and the GNSS receiver tracking loops 
were modelled with a flat random vibration power 
curve from 20Hz to 2000Hz with amplitude of 
0.005      and the oscillator vibration sensitivity 
            
   parts/g.  All CIFs and WIFs 
relative to antenna masking, geometric accuracy 
degradations, SNR, multipath and Doppler shift were 
generated. The main results obtained with the 
simulated GPS constellation are shown in Table 1.   
 
Table 1 GPS constellation simulation results 
 
 
CIF WIF 
Climb  ---  ---  
Turning 
Climb  
334~374s,  
426~446s  
517~558s  
---  
Cruise  874~900s  ---  
Level 
Turn  
901~1200s  
903~906s, 913s, 920~924s, 
930~931s, 938~942 s, 948~949s, 
956~959s, 966~967s, 974~977s, 
984~985s, 992~995s, 1002~1003s, 
1110~1113s,  
1020~1021s, 1028~1031s, 
1128~1129s, 1136~1139s, 
1146~1147s, 1154~1157s,  
1164~1165s, 1172~1175s, 
1182~1183s, 1190~1192s, 1200s  
Turning 
Descent  
1201~1441s,  
1448~1464s,  
1471~1487s  
1494~1500s  
1204s, 1223~1224s, 1247~1249s, 
1272~1273s, 1296~1297s, 
1320~1321s, 1344~1367s, 1368s, 
1391~1392s, 1414~1415s, 
1438~1439s, 1461~1462s, 
1484~1485s  
Descent  1503~1800s  ---  
Fourth Australasian Unmanned Systems Conference, 2014 
In some cases, the CIF was generated but it was not 
followed by the WIF (this was due to a temporary 
adverse relative geometry not leading to GNSS 
signal losses).  During the level turn and turning 
descent phases, the CIF was followed by the WIF.  It 
was also observed that the CIF was always triggered 
at least 2 seconds before the successive WIF onset 
(up to 13 seconds in one case during the turning 
descent phase).  These results are consistent with 
previous ABIA research on manned aircraft 
applications [1, 2, 3] and corroborate the validity of 
the models developed for the CIF/WIF thresholds.  It 
is evident that the availability of a usable CIF 
represents a significant progress in this research with 
the potential for both manned aircraft and RPASs to 
recover from mission- and safety-critical flight 
conditions potentially leading to GNSS data losses.  
Therefore, it is envisaged that a properly designed 
ABIA FPM could take full advantage of this 
predictive behaviour, allowing the RPAS to correct 
its flight trajectory/attitude in order to avoid the 
occurrence of the critical GNSS data losses.  
Additionally, it is possible that this predictive 
behaviour be exploited in the pursuit of a GNSS 
based auto-landing capability.  These results 
corroborate the validity of the models developed for 
the CIF/WIF thresholds.  It was also observed that 
the CIF was always triggered at least 2 seconds 
before the successive WIF onset.  This evidence is 
particularly important for the ABIA system design.  
In fact, it is evident that the availability of a usable 
CIF represents a significant progress in this research 
with the potential for both manned aircraft and 
RPASs to recover from mission- and safety-critical 
flight conditions potentially leading to GNSS data 
losses.  Therefore, it is envisaged that a properly 
designed ABIA FPM could take full advantage of 
this predictive behaviour, allowing the RPAS to 
correct its flight trajectory/attitude in order to avoid 
the occurrence of the critical GNSS data losses.  
Additionally, it is possible that this predictive 
behaviour be exploited in the pursuit of a GNSS 
based auto-landing capability.   
 
ABIA/DAA simulation 
The integration of ABIA into an existing RPAS 
DAA architecture was studied in various C-DAA and 
N-DAA scenarios. The test platforms used were: 
 AEROSONDE RPAS (ABIA/DAA host 
platform); 
 AIRBUS 320 (A320) and AEROSONDE RPAS 
intruders. 
In all test cases, an avoidance volume (sum of 
navigation and tracking errors) was generated by the 
DAA system [17]. PSO or DGO techniques were 
used to generate the new (optimal) trajectory based 
on the available time to conflict (i.e., host entering 
the avoidance volume). The avoidance trajectory was 
initiated by the DAA system when the probability of 
collision exceeded the required threshold value. 
Time, fuel, distance and integral distance were used 
in the cost functional, the RPAS 3-DOF dynamic 
model was used as dynamic constraint, and the 
minimum elevation criteria as path constraint for 
both PSO and DGO techniques. Boundary conditions 
were set from the values of the flight parameters at 
the first CIF epoch. Figure 7 illustrates the C-DAA 
test scenario where two AEROSONDE RPASs (1 
ABIA host platform and 1 intruder) are 90 off track 
on the same Flight Level (FL). The risk of collision 
is detected and resolved.  The host RPAS platform 
equipped with ABIA/DAA is able to generate an 
avoidance trajectory which is free from CIF/WIF 
occurrences. As depicted in Figure 7, the host RPAS 
DAA avoidance trajectory and the ABIA/DAA 
avoidance trajectory have a different rejoin point on 
the original track. To provide clarity, three different 
points are shown on the ABIA/DAA host platform 
trajectory: 
 DAA Break-off Point: Corresponding to the point 
where the host UA initiates the avoidance 
trajectory (commanded by the DAA system). The 
cost function criteria adopted in this case is 
minimum time. 
 DAA Safe Manoeuvring Point:  Corresponding to 
the point where the host RPAS can manoeuvre 
safely (any manoeuvre within its operational 
flight envelope) has 0 ROC.  From this point 
onwards the DAA cost function criteria switches 
to minimum time and minimum fuel to get back 
on the original (desired) track. 
 ABIA Re-join Point:  Corresponding to the point 
where the host RPAS re-joins the original 
(desired) track without GNSS data degradations. 
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DAA Break-off Point
DAA Safe Manoeuvring Point
ABIA Re-join Point
GNSS Data Loss – DAA Commanded 
Trajectory (without ABIA)
Host Platform ABIA/DAA
Intruder Platform
 
Figure 7 Simulation scenario and illustration of reference points 
 
 
 
The horizontal separation and predicted conflict 
probability in this case are shown in Figure 8 and 9 
respectively. 
 
 
Figure 8 Obtained horizontal separation 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9 Predicted conflict probability 
 
Figure 10 illustrates the N-DAA test scenario where 
the AEROSONDE RPAS (ABIA/DAA host platform) 
and an A320 are flying on the same FL but 90 off 
track to each other. 
 
 
Host Platform ABIA/DAA
Intruder Platform
Figure 10 90º non-cooperative DAA scenario 
 
The horizontal and vertical separation obtained is 
illustrated in Figure 11. 
 
 
 
Figure 11 Horizontal and vertical separation 
Fourth Australasian Unmanned Systems Conference, 2014 
Figure 12 illustrates a C-DAA test scenario where 
the ABIA host platform (AEROSONDE RPAS) and 
two intruders (two other AEROSONDE RPASs) are 
on the same FL.  
Conflict Resolution
Host Platform ABIA/DAA
Intruder Platform
Figure 12 Three RPAS cooperative DAA scenario 
 
One intruder RPAS is 90 off track and the other is 
following a head-on path with the host RPAS. The 
horizontal and vertical separation obtained with 
respect to intruder 1 and 2 are illustrated in Figure 13 
and 14 respectively. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13 Horizontal and vertical separation of 
intruder 1 
 
 
Figure 14 Horizontal and vertical separation of   
intruder 2 
 
The simulation results demonstrate that the ABIA 
IFG module is capable of generating integrity flags 
to provide both caution and warning signals when 
GNSS signals are degraded or lost. After the 
integrity caution flag is generated, the time available 
for the pilot/autopilot to react (before the integrity 
event is detected and the warning flag is generated), 
is at least 2 seconds. This TTC can support safety-
critical tasks including GLS curved/segmented 
precision approach and automatic landing 
applications. Data analysis shows that the ABIA 
system can provide useful integrity signals for CAT-
III precision approach and automatic landing 
(automated and real-time FPO is essential in this 
case). In the C-DAA and N-DAA scenarios 
investigated and in the dynamic conditions explored, 
all near mid-air collision threats were successfully 
avoided by implementing adequate trajectory 
optimisation algorithms. Both PSO and DGO 
algorithms proved successful in C-DAA and N-DAA 
scenarios depending on the available time for the 
optimisation loops (distance host-intruders and 
relative dynamics).  
 
Conclusions and future work 
In this research the synergies between a GNSS ABIA 
system and a novel RPAS DAA architecture for 
cooperative and non-cooperative applications were 
explored. The integration of ABIA with DAA leads 
to an Integrity Augmented DAA (IAS) solution, 
which can potentially support the safe and 
unrestricted access of RPAS to commercial airspace. 
Simulation case studies were performed for the 
ABIA IFG module, IFG/FPOM modules and 
ABIA/DAA integration. The trajectory optimization 
problem was mathematically formulated and the 
real-time capability of the FPOM was verified. From 
the results of the simulation activity, the following 
conclusions are drawn: 
 The ABIA IFG module is capable of generating 
integrity flags to provide both caution 
(predictive) and warning signals to the pilot when 
GNSS signals are degraded or lost. 
 After the CIF is generated, the time available for 
the pilot/autopilot to react before the WIF is 
generated, is sufficient for safety-critical tasks 
including GLS curved/segmented approach and 
automatic landing applications. 
 Data analysis shows that the ABIA system can 
provide the level of integrity required for CAT-
IIIC precision approach, which are currently 
unavailable with LAAS. 
 The ABIA integration into an existing RPAS 
DAA architecture proved that all near mid-air 
collision threats were successfully avoided by 
implementing suitable trajectory optimisation 
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algorithms. 
 The proposed ABIA/DAA integration 
architecture is capable of achieving adequate 
performance by avoiding critical satellite data 
losses while fulfilling the separation requirements 
set for DAA. 
Additional long-term objectives of this research 
include the following: 
 Investigate and compare different types of 
avionics sensor technologies and their potential to 
support the design of robust ABAS/ABIA 
architectures for manned aircraft and RPASs.  
 Extend the ABAS/ABIA concepts to the 
Aeronautical Data Link (ADL) application 
domain and investigate ABIA Line-of-Sight 
(LOS) and Beyond-Line-of-Sight (BLOS) 
communication interfaces for RPAS applications. 
 Investigate ABIA evolutions for Next Generation 
Flight Management System (NG-FMS) 
applications [31-36]: 
- Trajectory Optimization for Future CNS+A 
systems. 
- 4DT Intent Based Operations. 
- NG-FMS/ABIA Integration. 
 Study possible applications of the ABAS/ABIA 
concepts to advanced mission planning and 
forensic (accident investigation) applications.   
 Evaluate the potential of ABAS/ABIA to enhance 
the performance of next generation CNS/ATM 
systems for Performance/Intent Based Operations 
(PBO/IBO) and Four-Dimensional Trajectory 
(4DT) management [37]. 
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